Mutual Learning Exercise (MLE) on Research Integrity

Incentives
Challenge paper No 2

March 2019
MLE on Research Integrity: Challenge paper: Incentives

European Commission
Directorate-General for Research and Innovation
Directorate A Policy Development and Coordination
Unit A.4 — Reforms and economic impact – country intelligence

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Manuscript completed in March 2019.

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Mutual Learning Exercise (MLE) on Research Integrity

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Challenge paper No 2

Prepared by the independent expert: Daniele Fanelli
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1 INTRODUCTION

On July 10th 2018, representatives of 13 participating countries met in a Scoping Workshop for the Mutual Learning Exercise (MLE) on Research Integrity (RI) and agreed on four priority topics:

1. Processes and structures for the RI,
2. Incentives for RI,
3. Dialogue and communication about RI,
4. Training and education for RI.

This Challenge Paper addresses the second priority topic - Incentives for RI – with the aim of helping MLE participants prepare for the Second Working Meeting that will take place in Athens, GR, on the 12th and 13th of March 2019. The overall scope of this topic was defined in the Kick-off Meeting that took place on the 14th of November 2018 in Brussels, where representatives of all the 14 participating countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Norway, Spain, and Sweden) shared information about RI framework in their countries and discussed their learning objectives.

2 SCOPE

During the Scoping workshop and Kickoff meeting, participating countries manifested an interest in comparing and sharing practices, experiences and proposals on how to encourage good research practices at the institutional and individual level. In particular, it was decided that possible topics of exploration of the MLE on incentives might include:

1) Compare approaches to promote and encourage the adoption of research integrity and/or open sharing policies at the institutional level, including:

   a) Incentives to implement RI policies
   b) Incentives to comply with RI requirements
   c) Research performance evaluation criteria

2) Compare approaches to promote and encourage research integrity and/or open sharing of data and methods amongst individual researchers and lab leaders, including:

   a) Incentives to implement good research practices and/or sharing of data and methods
   b) Incentives to train and be trained in RI
   c) Research performance evaluation criteria

3) Share experiences, successful and unsuccessful, of setting either positive rewards (e.g. badges, criteria for promotion, prizes and awards) or punitive sanctions. In particular, sharing experiences about:

   a) Whether to require mandatory compliance rather than optional compliance with research integrity and data sharing standards
   b) Methods of verification of institutional and individual compliance with research integrity and Open Science
c) Assessing the effectiveness of policies in improving research practices

4) Gain a deeper understanding of possible intended and unintended consequences (costs and benefits) of:

a) Specific research integrity policies

b) Specific data sharing requirements

One of the overarching priorities that emerged in the first Kickoff meeting was that participants may have different understandings about what is meant by “incentives” in the context of research integrity and how incentives relate to the mission of National Research Integrity Offices. The topic of incentives in science is indeed very broad and rather complex and diversified, as it encompasses not just questions about research integrity and ethics more broadly, but also questions pertaining to human psychology and to the sociology of science. In the context of an MLE which aims to agree on actionable outcomes, this breadth constitutes in itself a major initial challenge to address.

Therefore, this Challenge Paper will first offer, in its "Landscape" section, a framing of the issue of incentives in the context of research integrity, in order to articulate the scope of the MLE more clearly and help focus the dialogue that will take place at the Working Meeting (Section 3.1). It will subsequently discuss the multifaceted problem of incentives, which can be positive as well as "perverse", and the risk of unintended consequences, in relation to relevant and recent academic literature (Sections 3.2 and 3.3). It will then review major recent policy reports, to highlight the current expectations placed on institutions to promote and incentivize research integrity (Section 3.4). These definitions and documents will offer the background to discuss any lessons learned (Section 3.5) and challenges to consider (Section 3.6).

3 LANDSCAPE

3.1 Definition of the problem

What do we mean by incentives?

In the context of research integrity, the concept of incentives can best be defined in antithesis to the concept, more commonly discussed, of "sanctions". Whereas the latter aim to change behaviour with the threat of a penalty – penalty that comes in the form of a cost paid in terms of career, social reputation, finances or even personal freedom - the former intend to encourage desirable behaviours by offering rewards of the same nature. That is, rewards in the forms of benefits to career, reputation or even financial benefits.

Who has the power to issue incentives?

The act of setting incentives to foster research integrity may appear fundamentally as a "top-down" approach to encourage desirable outcomes. It is “top-down”, because incentives have to be set by actors who have not just leadership status but also power to enact change.

However, the power to enact change in the scientific system is rather diffuse, because it is manifested in multiple forms and it can be expressed at multiple levels of the social and organizational system in science. Furthermore, the flow of information in the scientific system is not unidirectional and hierarchical, because each actor has the potential to influence, to some extent, all other actors with which it interacts. The effect of incentives, therefore, can operate horizontally and “trickle down” to all levels below, and may also diffuse upwards in the system, to any extent that higher levels are accountable to, and rewarded by, lower levels. Therefore, the relations of influence between actors in the scientific system may be best imagined as a set of concentric and porous circles, as suggested in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Pictorial representation of the spheres of influence within the academic research system.

Rather than constituting a rigid hierarchy, the levels are concentric and interconnected. Outer layers have greater potential for leadership and influence in setting incentives, but are typically not immune from the expectations and assessments at lower levels. Therefore, each actor may affect the incentives set for other actors.

As suggested in Figure 1, inter-university and/or national institutions dedicated to research integrity have the greatest potential for leadership and influence. By setting standards and rewards, they can incentivize desirable behaviours on multiple actors in the system.

*What aspects of research integrity can be incentivised?*

Just as there is a shared and interconnected responsibility for setting the right incentives, there are diffused and diversified roles that actors can play in promoting RI and therefore in setting the right incentives as well as benefitting from them. By playing different roles in the system, actors assume different levels of leadership and responsibility, each with its own potential for change. In order of increasing generality, these roles and responsibilities may include:

1) Conducting research with integrity, responsibility, transparency and accountability
   a. Special efforts in sharing data and methods
   b. Special efforts in ensuring the robustness, credibility of results

2) Encouraging good research practice in other actors
   a. Collaborative, communicative behaviours
   b. Efforts made to aid one’s lab/community/field improve methods and practices

3) Fostering an environment supportive of research integrity
   a. Setting up structures that aid promotion and awareness
   b. Creating events and initiatives to encourage open discussions

4) Seek training for oneself and actively training colleagues in research integrity
5) Actively promoting RI and preventing, reporting and amending behaviours that constitute research misconduct

a. Special efforts in aiding self-correction, e.g. helping uncover flaws with a common methodology or ensuring the correction or retraction of flawed publications.

b. Correcting or retracting one’s own flawed work.

This is a non-exhaustive list of commendable activities that could be rewarded by incentives, and other more detailed activities could be devised. Notably, most of the commendable activities above could be conducted by multiple actors in the system, as Table 1 illustrates.

Table 1 Examples of activities that could be incentivised (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conduct research with integrity, responsibility and accountability</th>
<th>Encourage good research practice</th>
<th>Foster an environment supportive of research integrity</th>
<th>Seek training for oneself and actively train others in research integrity</th>
<th>Actively promote RI and prevent, report and amend research misconduct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trainees</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior r.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lab lead</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School/dep</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Inter-univ</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(1): These are given in relation to which entities listed in Figure 1 could enact them. As the table suggest, most actors could be incentivised for most of the suggested activities.

What kinds of incentives can be offered?

In an academic research context, actors at all levels are motivated and rewarded firstly by increased professional recognition and influence, and secondarily by the prospect of material/financial gains. This is arguably the case not just for active researchers, but also for professionals who play a structural role in research, and for institutions that host, fund or promote research.

In practice, mainly four kinds of incentives for research integrity have been implemented to date:

1) **Informal acknowledgement**:

The scientific community can informally, but nonetheless concretely, bestow a higher standing to individuals who best exemplify the ethos of science. For example, studies have shown that scientists who self-retract their own articles once they find flaws in them – an act that undoubtedly signals high research integrity – receive private and public expressions of admiration by colleagues\(^1\) and, at least according to some analyses, might even enjoy a boost in citations to their non-retracted articles\(^2\)\(^3\).

2) **Formal acknowledgements**:

Badges, awards and other symbolic but official signs of recognition represent a more tangible and objective signal, that may more strongly promote desirable outcomes. An example of formal acknowledgement of research integrity are the “badges” that the journal Psychological Science, in collaboration with the Center for Open Science, has started to
“pin” on articles as a formal acknowledgement of openness in sharing data and/or materials.

3) **Formal honours and other marks of prestige:**

Granting exclusive access to prestigious roles and positions is, in addition to being a “badge” of honour, a concrete and tangible rewards that promotes directly an actor’s career and profile. Individuals may be rewarded by gaining access to important academic positions, whereas institutions are rewarded by acquiring new and greater leadership roles.

4) **Material access to research resources:**

Research grants and monetary awards such as the Nobel prize are amongst the strongest forms of reward in science, because they bring all the forms of recognition listed above, and in addition give actors the means to expand their activities or improve their financial status.

Programs that fund activities related to research integrity may be seen as such a form of incentive. A prime example of this approach is offered by The Netherlands. Following the lead, initiated many years before the United States, The Netherlands have devoted considerable funds to often neglected forms of research, such as replication studies, and to various programs of research on research integrity (see the Netherlands Research Integrity Network, www.nrin.nl). Grants for research on research integrity are not directly rewarding good research practice, but arguably incentivize RI indirectly, by promoting more interest and understanding of the phenomenon and increasing the prestige and visibility of the topic.

More direct financial incentives to "do the right thing" are offered, for example, by the Center for Open Science in its pre-registration challenge: authors who pre-register a study on the COS website (and then have their protocol reviewed and approved, and subsequently conduct the study and publish the results) are rewarded with a bonus of $1000. The initiative was reported to have met with considerable success and has so far attracted over 3,000 participants. Whether this had any effect on the quality of the published research remains, however, to be assessed.

### 3.2 Perverse Incentives

The need that is currently felt to re-set positive incentives is largely a response to the perception that current incentives in research are misaligned with research integrity, and therefore need correcting. As will be discussed below, even though this perception appears to be incorrect in many factual details, it finds continuing justification in the competitive nature of science and in the dramatic changes that the scientific method and system is undergoing today.

**Are pressure to publish and bibliometrics threatening research integrity?**

There have been long-standing concerns that undesirable side-effects may be brought about by excessive pressures to publish and misguided attention paid to a researcher's quantity of publications rather than substantive importance. Although such concerns had been expressed for at least a century, concerns for the problem have risen over the last few decades, in response to an increasingly bureaucratic and managerial approach to research performance assessment, which tends to be based on simplistic indices of productivity and citation metrics.

Empirical evidence, however, offers no conclusive support to some of the concerns commonly expressed. Indeed in some cases empirical evidence appears to refute them. For example, multiple recent studies have assessed, directly or indirectly, some of the effects that a publish or perish culture is said to generate. In particular, they assessed whether there has been an undue proliferation of trivial and fragmented publications produced by a "salami slicing" of research results. Contrary to what this scenario would
predict, evidence suggests that academic articles are getting longer and more complex. Furthermore, several studies have failed to observe a significant association between measures of productivity and impact of authors and proxies of scientific misconduct, such as the risk of having papers retracted, the risk of reporting over-estimated results, and the risk of improperly manipulating images. Finally, whereas it is true that academics co-author more articles today than in the past, they are not more productive on a fractional basis: the number of first-authored articles and that of fractional productivity have remained stable since at least the 1950s.

These findings are not necessarily refuting the notion that pressures to publish create perverse incentives, but suggest that the problem might be more nuanced and complex than normally stated. For example, multiple lines of evidence suggest that authors may have responded to pressures to publish primarily by co-authoring more articles, and it is possible that the main unwanted effect of pressures to publish is not a "salami slicing" of results, but a "salami slicing" of collaborations and other forms of questionable authorship practices.

Moreover, surveys consistently report that scientists are dissatisfied and frustrated with the system of incentives that, whether or not it directly impacts research integrity, it is unlikely to favour the production of high quality, reliable and reproducible research. It is in response to these concerns that manifestoes such as the San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment (DORA) and the Leiden Manifesto were born, offering guidance to the responsible and nuanced use of metrics in assessing researchers.

**Perverse incentives beyond pressure to publish**

Quite independent of pressures to publish and misuse of bibliometric indicators, perverse incentives have long been understood to constitute the unwanted side-effect of competition. Science is and always was a competitive enterprise, whose structure of rewards follows a “tournament model”, in which a small number of “winners” will enjoy great honours, benefits and resources.

The competitive nature of science is not negative *per se*. Quite to the contrary, competing for success is one of the prime motivators that drives the work of scientists forward, encouraging innovation, efficiency and even self-correction. However, the by-product of competitiveness is that little attention is going to be paid to anything that is not immediately beneficial to success. Ethical requirements, standards of rigour and transparency, openness to sharing data and methods, all these risk being trampled in the race to the top, if and to the extent that such trampling is perceived to be of minor consequence.

This overarching and ever-present concern justifies and inspires the numerous recent proposals to expand performance assessment criteria. For example, the proposal of the ACUMEN consortium, which suggested to consider multiple dimensions and measurements by flanking metrics with measures of expertise and influence and a narrative statement by the applicant. Another example is the report on the Culture of Scientific Research issued by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in 2014, which suggested various actions for promoting research integrity, cultivating an ethical environment, and assessing the track record of researchers with broader criteria, and promote standards of high quality in research.

**Science as a changing enterprise**

Even setting aside the issue of competition in science altogether, a powerful argument to re-align incentives in the research system comes from noticing how the system itself is being re-shaped. Like so many other institutions and practices of modern society, science is being radically transformed by ever more powerful information and communication technologies. These technologies permit the conduction of projects of unprecedented size and levels of complexity, opening new opportunities but also new challenges, which call for...
renewed attention to matters of research integrity and reproducibility. Indeed, this is arguably a much more compelling and inspiring narrative to promote research integrity compared to that of a “scientific crisis”.

In this context of radical and rapid developments, setting positive incentives to encourage the adoption of new and better practices seems an essential mission of leaders at all levels of the scientific system. This was the objective, for example, of The Amsterdam Call for Action on Open Science (2016), which saw in Open Science an opportunity to transform not just scientific communication, but also the way “we evaluate, reward, incentivize science”.

3.3 Unintended Consequences

If lack of regulation risks setting perverse incentives, excessive or misguided regulations may unintentionally hamper scientific progress or even be in themselves ethically problematic.

An emblematic case that is hotly debated in the literature is that of online public data sharing in research. On the one hand, concerns for the transparency and reproducibility of research results have inspired multiple institutions to set in place requirements for sharing research data. On the other hand, growing concerns have been expressed for the risk that mandatory data sharing may lead to breaches of ethical principles of data anonymity and protection rights for research subjects. Furthermore, an excessive rewarding of data sharing would unwittingly create new perverse incentives, which would discourage scientists from collecting large and complex data sets in favour of recycling publicly available ones, stifling real innovation and feeding a new class of “data parasites”.

Another vivid example of controversial ethical regulation arose in the context of clinical trial registration. In 2017, the US National Institutes of Health promulgated a new regulation that classified all brain imaging studies as clinical trials, thereby requiring from them very high standards of registration and data reporting. The requirements were hotly contested by neuroscientists, who perceived them to be a stifling financial and human cost, unnecessarily imposed on studies who present no specific risk for human health and no specific ethical risk for research subjects.

The example of brain imaging studies regulation points to a general risk that policy makers and ethicists are always called to consider when creating new regulations. No matter how well intentioned and important it is, every new layer of regulation imposed on research is, by definition, an added cost that detract resources from research itself, slows down progress and may ultimately discourage innovation altogether. It is therefore clear that an optimal balance needs to be struck between efforts to foster, promote and enforce research integrity standards and the need to protect the freedom, independence and unburdened creativity of researchers.

It may be argued that incentives to promote research integrity are a non-compulsory form of intervention, and therefore may be less at risk from unintended consequences. However, they are not immune from potential downsides. Firstly, because any activity or resource that is directed at incentivizing RI is, again, by definition subtracted to other objectives. Secondly, and more subtly, because new incentives are, as we said before, typically set from the top. Unless incentives are set after thorough consultation with stakeholders and continuing monitoring, they may fail to respond to actual needs and may even hinder research integrity and progress.

3.4 Incentives in European Guidelines

The most important and recent documents set an unambiguous mandate for researchers and research institutions to promote research integrity and set positive incentives. The European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity 2017, for example, states that research institutions and organizations should "promote awareness and ensure a prevailing
culture of research integrity" (pp. 5), that "Research institutions and organisations reward open and reproducible practices in hiring and promotion of researchers" (pp5), that "Researchers, research institutions and organisations ensure access to data is as open as possible, as closed as necessary, and where appropriate in line with the FAIR Principles (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable and Re-usable) for data management." (pp6), and concludes that "In their most serious forms, unacceptable practices are sanctionable, but at the very least every effort must be made to prevent, discourage and stop them through training, supervision and mentoring and through the development of a positive and supportive research environment." (pp9).

Equally explicit is the Roadmap drawn by Science Europe in 2013, which clearly explains that "Addressing research integrity requires a holistic approach, given the linkages with other aspects of the research system, such as access to publications and data, research careers, evaluation, peer review, and research collaboration." (pp21)

The Roadmap recommends that national institutions "Collaborate in developing appropriate incentive measures for scientists to archive and share their data, by promoting data management plans and support for research data collection;" (pp10). These recommendations are justified on the grounds that preventing misconduct “includes developing appropriate incentives for fostering a culture of integrity, and setting high standards for researchers and institutions. All aspects of the research process – from funding, through employment contracts, peer-review processes and collaborative projects, to handling research data and publications – should take integrity issues into account. All sanctioning measures must be underpinned and preceded by pedagogical efforts aimed at instilling a culture of integrity, and at preventing the occurrence of cases of research misconduct." pp22

The recent Bonn-PRINTERGE Consensus Statement, produced in the context of the PRINTERGE consortium project, also recommended a greater use of incentives to promote and foster research integrity. "Taking into account that indicators change the system through the incentives they establish, university leadership should adopt policies of good practice for responsible research assessment" and they refer to the aforementioned Leiden Manifesto as an example of guideline to follow. The statement adds that "National research policy makers should similarly be aware of potential effects of making university funding strongly dependent on a narrow range of indicators related to, for example, international peer-reviewed publications or patents" (pp1027-1028)

With regards to the mandate to "Open Up research", the statement expresses an awareness of possible unintended consequences and takes a balanced perspective by stating that "Data should be made available, potentially after a grace period of exclusive access for the organisation generating the data." (pp 1029)

A perception that incentives in research may be misaligned is also frequently expressed in institutional policy documents. University guidance documents on research integrity and misconduct, for example, where found to contain sentences indicating that productivity and/or competition were indicated as possible causes of integrity failures in at least 7 out of the 18 cases examined.

3.5 Evidence of use of incentives in the EU

Despite the existence of a mandate for institutions to incentivize good research practice, examples of concrete incentives to promote research integrity in institutions appear to be still rare. This fact is illustrates most clearly by the results of one of the work packages for Printegger, which issued the report "Managing research integrity: An assessment of best practices from the organisational literature". As the title suggests, the main objective of this package was to identify European research organizations that had already implemented exemplary strategies. Despite being able to rely on background inventories, European surveys and new case study data obtained by other work packages in the same project, they reported to have been "unable to identify good case examples at the organizational level". Therefore, instead of describing actual examples, the report offers a
general overview of the issue, and conclude that “Regarding leadership practices, knowledge is needed on the type of leadership and managerial structures that facilitate research integrity. While a considerable amount of research has been done on integrity more generally, the big question is how the general managerial knowledge should be applied in the context of governing research” (pp 21).

Similarly, the report failed to identify case studies for successful or unsuccessful promotion of open science practices and concluded that “we need to understand how the policy efforts impact researchers and also how the policies can be implemented most successfully. For instance, how does the policies relate to, and possibly clash with, different measurement systems across academia which do not take open science into account?”(pp 21).

Although the use of incentives is still rare, its antecedent, in the form of a more general promotion of awareness of research integrity, is pursued by several European organizations. This was suggested by results of the report Research Integrity Practices in Science Europe Member Organisations32, based on a survey conducted in 2014. It covers 33 different organizations for 27 countries (RCUK responded on behalf of 7 Research Councils in the United Kingdom, each of which is a member organization). Research integrity practices were surveyed by the Working Group on Research Integrity, which adapted a survey instrument used by the Danish Agency of Science, Technology and Innovation in a previous survey, conducted in 2012 among members of the European Network of Research Integrity Offices (ENRIO) and a few other countries.

Activities to promote awareness of research integrity were reported by 20 Member Organizations (MO), and included activities such as "raising awareness within the organisation itself, communicating about the importance of research integrity through presentations, publishing articles in the general press, or organising courses and workshops. In some instances, participating in training by researchers is mandatory in order to be funded.” (pp14)

Data about the MLE participant countries mirrors the picture offered by European surveys. Table 2 reports preliminary data, obtained by online resources or by consultation with representatives of the participant countries. Although this data is preliminary and not an exhaustive list of all activities and initiatives presently being discussed, it lists several activities aimed at promoting and preventing via awareness and communication. However, it shows a paucity of activities that are explicitly aimed at rewarding good research practices. Furthermore, whereas a few countries have implemented or are considering plans to have compulsory compliance with research integrity practices or training, only a few are considering incentives proper, i.e. positive awards that may inspire other actors.
Table 2 Examples of activities to promote, prevent and set incentives for RI, by MLE participants (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>National or inter-university RI body</th>
<th>Promoting RI and Preventing RM</th>
<th>Incentives for RI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Austria | Austrian Agency for Research Integrity | Various activities, including:  
• Advising  
• Training  
• Development of policy documents  
• Establishment of and contribution to working groups and networks |  | oeawi.at |
| Bulgaria | Committee on Academic Ethics |  |  |  |
| Denmark | Danish Agency for Science and Higher Education | The Agency facilitates an exchange of experience between the various research institutions as part of the Agency’s promotion of research integrity. |  | ufm.dk |
| Estonia | Estonian Research Council (ETAg) | ETAg has organized several workshops and seminars for the whole community during past years. |  | etag.ee |
| Finland | Finnish National Board on Research Integrity (TENK) | The National Board’s activities focus on various national and international specialist tasks and networking, with a view to improving the culture of research integrity. This includes counselling researchers and postgraduate students, as well as other preventative work.  
TENK has created a network of Research Integrity Advisers. Since the start of 2017, TENK has trained more than 100 advisers in more than 60 research organisations to provide low threshold, personal advice on research integrity. |  | tenk.fi |
| France | French Office for Research Integrity (OFIS) | The OFIS has three missions:  
• To serve as a common platform of expertise  
• To act as an Observatory reporting and spreading information about Scientific Integrity  
• To provide support for all the French actors willing to share their resources and good practices. |  |  |
| Greece | |  |  |  |
| Ireland | National Forum for Research Integrity (NFRI); Health Research Board (HRB); Royal Irish Academy (RIA) | Activities coordinated by the Forum include:  
- Monitoring international developments and policy in the area of research integrity, and making appropriate recommendations for adjustments in research integrity policy and practice in Ireland;  
- Communicating the importance of research integrity to the Irish research community and to the general public.  

The RIA worked closely with the academic and research community and research funders to build awareness of research integrity issues, organising and hosting several public seminars and workshops enabling public discussion and sharing of national and international best practice. |
|---|---|---|
| Lithuania | Office of the Ombudsperson for Academic Ethics and Procedures | Activities of the Office include:  
- Advising (e.g. FAQ, private)  
- Training  
- Development of topic-related guidelines (e.g. about codes of ethics)  
- Analytical studies related to a specific topic (topic-oriented country reports)  
- Establishment of topic-specific working groups  

Networking with the Lithuanian University Rectors’ conference, the Lithuanian University of Applied Sciences Rectors’ conference, other governmental bodies, such as the Research Council of Lithuania, the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport and, when needed, with international stakeholders (e.g. ENRIO)  

Plans are being discussed about:  
- Establishment of ethical approval procedure in doctoral studies and research projects’ funding  
- Awards for the best initiative/activi ty in and essay on academic/research integrity are planned from the next year |  
http://www.etika.gov.lt |
| Luxembourg | Luxembourg Agency for Research Integrity (LARI); Luxembourg’s Fonds National de la Recherche (FNR) | Activities of LARI include:  
- a system of Coaches who provide support, encouragement, and guidance as researchers progress along their project path, and helps them produce robust, ethical research. The Coaches are trained by LARI.  
- a free ethics consult service to researchers of all levels (Faculty, staff, students) who are affiliated with its member organizations.  
- LIH provides a statistics consultation service.  

FNR provides several training sessions in scientific communication to ensure communication is ethical (unbiased).  

Yearly, the FNR give 4 awards (5000€ each) for robust research:  
- Outstanding PhD Thesis,  
- Outstanding Research-Driven Innovation,  
- Outstanding Promotion of Science to the Public,  
- Outstanding Scientific Publication |  
lari.lu |
| Moldova |  | Special rules are in place linking evidence of RI to:  
- calls for the position of members in |
(1): The table reports a suggestive, and not exhaustive, list of activities related to promoting RI, preventing RM and setting incentives for good research practice, by inter-university institutions operating the countries participating to the MLE.

### 3.6 LESSONS

Although it had failed to identify case studies of incentives being implemented, the PRINTEGER report highlighted examples of innovation that are moving in that direction. The country of Norway, in particular, was indicated as leading the way with its new research ethics law enacted in May 2017, which places greater legal responsibility on research organizations to both handle cases of misconduct and to prevent and promote research integrity. As the Printeger report in question documents, this legislation was inspired by the belief that building a culture of integrity in an institution requires "managerial attention, a systematic approach, training of everyone involved in research (also students), and competence of all individuals involved – also internal and private sector collaborators" and that "research ethics must be integrated in all phases of the research activities, including planning, execution and publication."

Other work packages of the PRINTEGER project have offered new ideas on how RI could be incentivized. In particular, the WP V report "Tools for research leaders and managers: addressing and stimulating integrity in research organisations" suggests to use three tools derived from the Organizational Science literature:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Activities contributed by Etikkom include:</th>
<th>The recent Code of Conduct for Research Integrity adopted by Ministry of Research has a pro-active approach, focussed on education and creating a culture of quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>National Research Ethics Committees (Etikkom)</td>
<td>- curating an open-access anthology on RI&lt;br&gt;- a yearly conference is organized for teachers and people responsible for RI at the different institutions.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.etikkom.no">www.etikkom.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Ethics Committee of the Spanish National Research Council - CSIC</td>
<td>The recent Code of Conduct for Research Integrity adopted by Ministry of Research has a pro-active approach, focussed on education and creating a culture of quality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Group on Research Misconduct at Ethical Review Appeal Board</td>
<td>The Swedish research council (VR) is currently working on an Ethical policy to inform and promote good research practice among the grants applicants. The ethical policy covers the research that is funded, the application process and the funding decision process.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.etikkom.no">www.etikkom.no</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1) Integrity Café, which aim to create "a safe atmosphere to motivate open conversation and reflection". Inspired by the model of World Café, the integrity café aims to create a relaxed and friendly atmosphere to discuss matters of integrity in an institution in small groups. The integrity café relies on the following elements: 1) set the context, deciding who should take part and why; 2) create a hospitable space by arranging lighting and furniture appropriately; 3) explore questions that matter, by identifying thought-provoking questions and examples; 4) encourage everyone’s contribution; 5) connect diverse perspectives, encouraging people to move between tables, or even giving a structure to the groups that then changes over the night (e.g. first tables all of students, all of professors, then mingle); 5) listen together for patterns and insights; 6) harvest by sharing common themes discovered with the rest of the room.

2) Value visioning workshops: which are interactive team-building exercises to create visions and images that embody the values and ideals of the organization.

3) Ethics reflection workshops: which may take many forms but with the central objective "to facilitate a systematic dialogue and reflection"

They also suggest a number of "content" tools, which include topics such as "local integrity officer role", "employee appraisal conversations", "ethics guidelines", "work environment mapping", "quality assurance system" and especially Managerial assessments of performance criteria, in which "Assessments should draw on initiatives such as the Leiden Manifesto for research metrics and the San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment (DORA), involving alternatives to journal-based metrics for evaluation of researchers' performance."

Other tools to promote and incentivize research integrity may be produced within the ongoing project Standard Operating Procedures for Research Integrity (SOPs4RI), which aims to "stimulate transformational processes across European research performing organisations (RPOs) and research funding organisations (RFOs)" in order to offer guidelines and tools to promote RI, adopt appropriate incentives and novel sanctions.

Participating countries expressed their interest for sharing experiences regarding good practices in promoting the dialogue on research integrity within and among relevant institutions and the communication with the public to enhance a culture for RI and to engage key stakeholders. Despite existing differences in countries’ experiences in developing the RI system and its current structure and procedures, it would be possible to agree on basic recommendations how to promote the dialogue and communication to foster RI. This will be the challenge of the third MLE meeting on RI – to create guidance for best practices in relation to two issues: promoting the dialogue with different stakeholders in RI and communication related to RI investigations.

3.7 Challenges

In light of the literature reviewed above and of the information gathered about participating countries, the following challenges are identified as priority areas to discuss and share experiences about.

1) Which activities related to research integrity can be incentivized?

Whereas much of the discussion surrounding incentives in academia verges around the misuse of metrics and a culture of pressures to publish, there may be a variety of activities that contribute directly or indirectly to research integrity that could be encouraged by means of incentives (examples are offered in Table 1 and further ideas of activities are described in the Lessons section).

2) What types of incentives can be implemented?
Institutions within the participant countries have several options to consider, which include not just re-thinking research evaluation criteria, but also giving prizes, grants, granting special positions and roles.

3) What may be the unintended consequences of a given activity-incentive?

Each combination of activity (following questions 1) and incentive (following question 2) presents potential benefits and costs, the balance of which is likely to vary from country to country, discipline to discipline, and perhaps even from institution to institution. As suggested in the original priorities of this MLE, participants may consider how these new ideas would compare to the more traditional approach based on compliance, leading to a final, secondary question:

a. What advantages and disadvantages would such incentives have compared to compulsory regulations?

To guide and aid the dialogue and exchange of ideas and experiences, participants may examine each idea for its pros and cons using a SWOT (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis. Table 3 illustrates the logic of this analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Advantages/ desirable outcomes</th>
<th>Disadvantages/challenges/unintended consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strengths:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Weaknesses:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What makes this activity-incentive particularly suitable, applicable, and useful for your organization?</td>
<td>What makes this activity-incentive unfeasible, impractical or unlikely to yield the desired outcomes, if it were implemented by your organization?</td>
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<td><strong>Opportunities:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Threats:</strong></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By sharing experiences and reflecting on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of possible activities and incentives, participants to the MLE will have an opportunity to develop and assess new ideas for initiatives and activities to implement in their respective organizations and countries.
REFERENCES


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